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REFRAMING SYSTEMS DISASTERS WITH THREE PERSPECTIVES OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Kn ren L. Page, Uni versit y o f Wyo ming 
Jnmes B. Page, Aktos Analyti cs, LLC 
This paper presents th e major literature 011 ~ystems disasters and how orgalli~atio11al culture is portrayed in this literature. 
Th e paper th en outli11 es the three cultural p erspectives used by Martin (2002) to describe organizational cultures: 
i11tegration , differelltiatioll, and fragmentation. Th e paper explores how these p erspectives influen ce interpretations about 
th e disasters described. The paper con cludes that th e effect of a11 organization's culture 011 safety, reliability, and disasters 
can be ful~)' understood on~)' wh en all three perspectives are applied. 
In 1984 Yale Soc iolog ist Charl es Perrow co ined th e 
phrase "normal acc ident" in a book bea ring that name to 
ex plain unex pected, and hence unavo idable, disas ters that 
ari se out o f complex, tig htl y coupled systems. Examples of 
such disasters include T hree Mi le Is land , the Va luJ et crash, 
and the Space Shutt les Chall enger and Co lumbi a. Acco rding 
to Perrow, one o f th e hallmarks o f a normal acc ident is the 
incomprehensibilit y o f eve nt s whil e they arc occurring. 
Consider, for example, the T hree Mi le Is land incident , whi ch 
wns the culminati on o f four fa ilures a ll occurring within 13 
seconds, some o f which we re fai lures o f sa fety systems, and 
any one of whi ch, by itself, would not have been a problem. 
The lit erature on T hree Mil e Island and other systems 
di sns ters has bene fit ed from th e ins ights of politi cal 
sc ie nl isis (e.g., Sagan, 1993 ), soc io log ists (e.g ., PerTow, 
1984; Clarke, 200 1; Vaughan, 1996; Weick, 1993); soc ial 
psycholog ists (e.g., Snook, 2000), and orga ni za ti onal 
behav iorali sts (e.g., Morri s and Moore, 1999; 1-l au nschild 
and Sulli vn n, 2002). While orga ni za ti onnl cui lu re as a 
va riab le in sys tems di sasters is refe rred to ex plicitl y in some 
of these lii eralu res (e.g., Va ughan, 1996; Weick, 1987) , and 
implicitl y in others (e .g., Weick, 1990; La Pone and 
Conso lini , 199 1 ), there is no consistent pa tt ern in the 
references to culture that a ll ows us to un derstand what 
culture means in the contex t o f sys tems di sa<; ters :1nd how 
th e fi e ld co ul d benefit from such a di scuss ion. 
We ick ( 1987) does, howeve r, anti c ipate the importance 
o f culture in sys tems disas ter in hi s paper enti tl ed 
"Organi za ti onal Culture and High Reli ab ilit y." Weick 
argues, fo r exa mple, th at inertia is a complex sta te and that a 
dny o f no-errors should be praised as a diffi cult stntc to 
achi eve. In other words, an unevenl ful day at air traffi c 
control should be as exc it ing as a no-hitter baseball game. 
Ye t as enac ted in orga ni za ti ons thnt req uire hi gh re li ab ilit y, 
uneventfu l days are construed as j u t the opposit e, as 
ex pressed by a nuclear power plan operator: " I' ll te ll yo u 
wh<t l du ll is. Dull is opera ting the power plant" ( 1987: 11 8). 
'vVe ick argues that to effectu ate a system o f re liabilit y in the 
fa ce of ted ium, more attention needs to be paid to 
organi zati ons as " interpre tatio n sys tems that generate 
me;:ltl rng" rather th <t n "orga niza tio ns as dec is ion makers" 
( 1987: 123 ). The impo rtance o f th is emphas is is summari zed 
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by Cohen, March and Olsen' s ( 1976) descripti on of an 
organiza tion as ' 'a set of procedures for argumentation and 
interpretati ons as we ll as for so lvin g problems and making 
dec isions." Weick goes on to argue that "[ m)aking meaning 
is an issue o f culture'' ( 1987: 123 ). 
Further, culture can crea te a sys tem that is both 
centrali zed and decentralized, whi ch is prec isely what hi gh 
re li ab ilit y requires (Perrow, 1984). Culture does this by 
creating ' 'a homogeneo us se t o f assumptions and dec ision 
premises whi ch, when they are in vo ked on a local and 
decentrali zed b:~ s i s, pre'· ' rve coord ination and 
ce ntr:~ l i za ti o n" (Weick, 1987: 124). 
In creati ng a hr gh re li abil it y culture, We ick stresses the 
importance of stori es ( 1987: 125) : 
Ri chard Feynman te ll s a story about the Chall enger 
disaster when he dips 0- ring materi al from the booster 
into a glass o f ice water and di scove rs that it becomes 
brittl e. Rudolph Pick, a chcmi c<t l enginct: r \\'riling to the 
New York Times on January 14, 1986, observed that the 
onl y way he could im press peo ple with the danger of 
overfi lling vesse ls with chemica ls was to usc what he 
ca ll ed the psycholog ical app roach. "A ft er I immersed a 
piece of chi cken mea t for several minutes in the toxic 
and corros ive liquid, onl y the bone remained. Nobody 
took any short cuts to established procedures a ft er this 
demonstrati on and there were no inj uncs." Pick tell s 
thi s story abo ut hydro nuori c ac id and the message 
rem<t ins with people once th ey scatt er to their var ious 
ass ignments. Thus, the story coo rdi nates them by 
instilling a s imilar set o f dec is ion premises. But the 
story also wo rks because, from this small incident , 
peo ple are able to remember and reconstruct a 
compli ca ted set of chemical interac ti ons that wo uld be 
forgott en were some oth er medium, such as a se t of 
regul ati ons, used. 
Essenti all y, Weick argues for hi gh rcli ::Jbi lity through 
orga ni za ti onal stories . He argues th at stori es crea te a much 
ri cher store of we ll -remembered tac it knowledge than 
orga ni zati onal rul es ever can. In other wo rds, culture, as 
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represented by sto ries, can be an important fac to r in hi gh 
reliability systems. 
Stories, however, are just one aspec t o f o rga ni za ti onal 
culture that may be important in the study o f sys te ms 
disasters. Other manifes tati ons o f culture inc lud e fo rmal 
practices, informa l practices, ritua ls, language and jargon, 
humor, and phys ica l arrangements (Martin , 2002). These 
manifes tations may take many fo rms. Stories, fo r example, 
need not be accura te po rtraya ls o f events ; myths arc j ust as 
important to organiza tiona l culture. Hazing and 
indoc trination may be fo rms of fo rmal o r info rm al prac ti ces 
or ritua ls. 
Langewiesche ( 1998a) describes how language p layed a 
role in the crash o f Va luJ e t Flight 592 in 1996: 
It was known fro m the sta rt tha t fire too k the a irpl ane 
down. The federal in ves tiga ti on began with in hours, 
with the arri va l tha t evening o f a Nationa l 
Transportation Safe ty Boa rd tea m from Was hington. 
The inves tiga to rs set up shop in an ai rport ho te l, whi ch 
they began to re fer to as the ··comm and pos t. " The 
language is import ant. As we will see, s imi lar fo rms o f 
linguisti c s ti ffn ess, spec ifica ll y eng ineerspeak, 
ultimate ly proved to have been in vo lved in the downing 
of Flight 592 - and thi s is a fac to r the TSB 
inves ti ga to rs . because o f the ir own verbal awkward ness, 
have bee n unable to quite recogni ze. 
Perrow ( 1983 :534-53 5) underlines on the importance o f 
phys ical arrange ments in c rea ting o rga ni za ti onal c ulture in 
his discuss ion of the se lf- re inforc ing o rgani zati onal 
structures and human fa c to rs engineers: 
Litt le tho ught has been g iven in nuclea r power pl ant 
design fo r routine ma intenance. eng ineering, and 
operato r tours so that personne l ca n inte rac t and share 
info rma tion. Fortunate ly. the re is a centra l co ntro l room 
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where fa ce- to-face int eraction can take place, but even 
where the des ign a llows thi s, managemen t po licy is to 
discourage inte raction because mana gers fear that 
company time will be used for conversat ion about 
persona l topi cs. l could find no evidence that in 
commerc ia l a ir line operati ons provis ions were made in 
the des ign o f support sys tems for the fli ght crews and 
at tend ants to have comfortable , informal co ntac t with 
the maintenance c rew, cabi n-serv ic ing crew, o r those 
who direct the a ircraft on the g round . This iso lati on o f 
wo rk groups promotes stereotyp ing. Personnel 
so metimes build unautho ri zed bridges to ov.erco me thi s 
iso la ti on. Tha t such bridges mi ght then be "misused" fo r 
persona l ends, even whil e they a re used for essenti all y 
o rgani za ti onal ends, is no t surprising. 
O the r autho rs have identified these cultural 
manifes tatio ns in expli c it di sc uss ions o f the ro le o f 
o rgani za ti ona l culture in sys tems di sasters. Va ughan ( 1996), 
fo r examp le, extens ively di scusses the ·'producti on" culture 
at NA SA. La ngewi esche ( !998b) describes the pi lot, 
contro lle r, management , and FAA subcultures of a ir tra ffi c 
contro l. And We ick ( 1990) ex poses the shifting, ambi guous 
cues and ro les o f the parti es in vo lved in the Tenerife 
disas ter. 
THREE PERSPECTIVES OF ORGA NIZA TIO AL 
CULTU R E 
Va ughan, Langewiesche, and Weick a ll view co mp lex , 
tightly co upled syste ms through one o f three perspectives 
articul ated by Marti n (2002) tha t have co me to dominate 
research on o rgani za ti onal culture: integrati on, 
diffe re nti at ion, and frag mentation. 
Martin 's (2002) matrix summ arizes these perspecti ves 
as shown in Tab le I : 
Tab le I: T h ree Pers pectives of Organizat ional C ulture 
Integration Differentiation Fragmentation 
Organiza tio n Co nse nsus throughout No o rgani za ti on-wide Issue-spec ific attentio n 
o rgani zatio n. Goa l is co nsensus. Orga niza ti on with no co nse nsus. 
-~ ass imil ati on and is a c lus te r o f 
Pattem s of iss ue-
_g, co nformity. subcu I tures. acti va tion in flu x. 
<:: Group N o important subcultura l Relati on of subcultures Subcultura l bounda ries ::: 
"' differe nces. can be: enhancing, uncert a in , flu ctuating, "2' co nflic ting, o r b lurred , nes ted, 
~ independ ent. overl apping. , 
"" Self is co mposed o f Self is fragmented, in -...) Individua l Se lf is unifi ed , constant 
me mber o f the culture. multiple subcultura l flu x, no central unit y. 
identities. 
Source: Martin , 2002 
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T he integrati on perspecti ve focuses on the aspec ts of 
culture that tend to create commonalit y and predictabi lit y 
and minimize conflict and confusion by generating mutuall y 
ful fi ll able ex pcct;:ltions (Martin , 2002). The integrati on 
perspecti ve focuses on clarit y, consistency, and consensus. 
Weick' s ( 1987) prescri ption of stori es as a way to enhance 
reliab ility i an " integ ra ti on' ' view of culture. That is, he 
des ri bes culture primaril y in terms of consistency (across 
the vari ous manilc~ t at i on s of culture), orga niza ti on-wide 
consensus (rega rd ing the int erpretati ons of those 
ma ni fes tations), and clarit y. 
Va ughan ( 1996) also adopts an integration definition o f 
cultu re in her d i ~cuss i on of th e production culture at NASA . 
he sees cult ure as insti tut ionali zed scri pts that consist of 
ru les o f appropriateness " that constra in choice by shapi ng 
the menu o f poss ible opti ons peo ple consider, mak ing some 
cho ices viab le and prec luding others" ( 1996: 197). Imp licitly 
definin g cult ure a~ those orga ni za ti onal ani fac ts th at 
mani fest consistency, clarity, and consensus , Va ughan writes 
( 1996: 199)," bared cult ural meaning systems give 
o therwise di verse groups an understandi ng o f the 
requirements o f each other 's roles, enab ling them to 
nego ti ate accommoda ti ons dur ing confli cts that grow out of 
role necess iti es." 
La Pon e and Con. olini ( 199 1 ), too, assume the 
in tegration perspecti ve o f cultu re in their analysis of hi gh 
re liabi lit y organizations - meaning those with good track 
records at hand ling hazardous techn olog ies, such as a ircra f"t 
ca rr iers, a ir traffi c cont rol cent ers, and cert ain power 
companies. T hey describe such orga ni zations wit h words 
such as "cons1stcncy' ' and "stab ilit y" ( 199 1 :24). They po1nt 
out that hi gh re liabi lit y orga ni za ti ons " in vest a grea t deal in 
recruiti ng, soc ia li zation, and incenti ves to assure th at there is 
agreement abo ut organ iza ti onal miss ion" ( 199 1:24, 
emp has is added) . Furt her, "Co nsensus is unequi voca l" 
( 199 1:24). 
The differenti ati On pe rspecti ve , in contras t, portra ys 
cultu ral manifestati ons as in conlli c t with one another and 
focuses on inconsistencies, lack of consensus, and non-
leader-cent ered sources o f cultural content (Martin , 2002). 
Langewieschc' ( 1998b) di scuss ion o f a ir traffi c control is 
replete with references to the subcultural tensions across the 
organi zational level s. As one contro ll er comp laim:d 
( 1998b: 182): 
You seemed surpri sed that contro ll ers now have a 
vested interes t in the fa il un.: o r embarrass ment o f the 
FAA . But " they" have taken our pro fess ion and ur air 
traffi c control and co mp letely screwed it up. "They" 
have blown every opportunit y to do what is ri gi11 . 
''They" ha ve devoted their efforts to the god less 
Burea ucracy. "They'' have rclcga t d us to second class 
status. "They" have co mpletely forgo tten why " they'' 
and "we" arc here. 
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T hi s tension across leve ls is a lso ev ident withi n the control 
tower ( 1998b: 179) : 
[A) controll er in New York mimicked hi s bosses for me. 
He , aid, "When I was a controll er, I worked aircraft. 
That was easy. I told them what to do and they did it. 
Now that I' m management, I work controllers. Same 
dea l. I te ll yo u what to do, and yo u do it. " 
Snook (2000) , in his analys is of the acc idental 
shoo tdown o f U.S. Blackhawks over No1 hem Iraq in 1994, 
views the Armed Forces from a different perspecti ve. The 
most obvious competing subcult ures are the Air Force and 
Army, with their incompatib le missions and technolog ies. A 
marvelous manifestati on o f tensions crea ted by ph ys ica l 
arrangement s arc the photographs used to trai n the F- 15 
pil ots, who fl y th rough th e air, that were taken by the Army 
from the ground . Even with in the Air Force there are many 
confl ictin g subcultures: the F- 15 pilots, the F- 16 pilots, the 
1\ WACS enli sted crew, the 1\ WA S ffi cers, and the 
ground crew. 
Thi s differenti ation view is also ev ident in Perrow's 
( 1983) paper on human factors engineer ·. Perrow identifi es 
at least four orga ni zationa l sub-groups that have differing 
prioriti es: top manage n. nl, des ign engi neers, human factors 
engineers, and ope ators. Perrow clea rl y identifi es structura l 
factors that re info rce th e power of manage ment and des ign 
en •i ncers and rclcgatt: the human fa ctors engineers and 
operat ors to second-c lass status. li e a lso hint s at the 
diffe ring sub-cul tures among these groups that hinder 
unpkmcnt a11 0n of human factors enginee rs' sugges tions and 
pt: rpetu atc the orga nizat ional structures. Perrow cites , for 
exa mple, the d ifferent log1cs that guide des ign eng ineers 
versus operators, and the cultures that suppo rt the log ics 
( 191\3:535) 
fTh c human as poo r substitute for machine] perspective, 
mgnuned 111 students by cngim:ering schoo ls and 
common in top mana ge ment , pervades the cult ure of the 
des ign engineer. It leads to equipment that at best is 
only to be monit ored by an operator, and th us leads to a 
s cia ! structure o f incenti ves, pu nishment s, ph ys ica l 
la yo uts, output meas ures, etc., that re1nforcc the 
perspecti ve of des igning out the "man" in the loop. The 
structure of the organi zat ion is in part an 
acco mmoda tion to th is perspecti ve. The opera tor, in 
copi ng wit h the structu re, provides the very res istance 
th at confirms the predi cti ons. 1\ wa rcncss of thi s 
pervas ive culture could lead to alt cmativc engineeri ng 
des igns. 
Unl ike the integrati on view, which sees organi zati onal 
clar it y, consistency and consensus, and the differenti ation 
view, which sees clarit y, consistency, and consensus wi thin 
subgroups at odds with each o ther, th e frag ment ati on 
perspecti ve docs not presume any clar it y, consistency, or 
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consensus a t any leve l (Ma11in, 2002). Instead , the 
fragmenta ti on perspecti ve attends to incons istenc ies and 
further differentiation within subcultures. It s tresses 
individual adjustment to environmenta l Ouc tu ations, 
inc luding pattem s o f attention and inte rpre tati on. We ick 's 
(1990) descripti on of the T enerife a ir di sas ter is repl e te with 
inconsistencies, subcultura l differentiati on and indi vidual 
adjustment to environmental flu c tuati ons. Snook 's (2000) 
description of the phys ica l arrangement s in the A \V ACS a lso 
sugges ts a manifestatio n o f culn1re tha t could be de tected 
from the fra gmenta ti on perspec ti ve. 
In light of the trea tment o f cult"ure in th e forego ing 
literarure, it may be temptin g to a rgue that the three 
perspec ti ves s impl y represent d iffe re nt leve ls o f ana lys is: the 
integration perspecti ve loo ks a t the firm level, the 
differentiation perspecti ve looks a t the group leve l, and the 
fragmentation perspecti ve looks a t the ind ividual level. To 
do so, however, wo uld be to mi ss the depth and ri chness of 
info rmation tha t each o f these perspecti ves ca n revea l at 
each level. Indeed , eac h perspecti ve can revea l different 
meanings and inte rac ti ons fro m th e sa me manifes tati ons a t 
each level. 
THE THREE PERSPECTIVES COI\ IPARIW 
The ab ility o f o rgani zatio na l a rti fa c ts a t a ll leve ls to be 
viewed from diffe rent lenses ca n be seen in co mparing the 
integrati on approach that La Po rte and Co nso lin i ( 199 1) take 
in s tudying hi gh re li ab ilit y o rga ni z:nio ns with Snook' s 
(2000) , Langew iesche's ( 1998a) , and Rochlin 's ( 199 1) 
differentiation (a nd so me times fragmentati on) approaches to 
similar o rga ni za tio ns. La Porte and Co nso lini , fo r exa mpl e, 
make the fo llowing c la ims wi th respec t to the hi gh re li ab ility 
organi zatio ns (H ROs) in the ir stud y ( 199 1 :23-24 ): 
The HROs in thi s s tud y a re charac te ri zed by well -
agreed-upon operati onal goa ls. Those in the 
organi za tio ns ca rry on intens ive e ffo rts to know the 
phys ica l and dynami c properties o f the ir prod uc ti on 
technolog ies, and they go to co ns id erab le pa ins to buffer 
the effec ts o f environmenta l surpri ses . In mos t rega rds, 
the organi za tions co me c lose to meetin g the co nditi ons 
o f c losed ra ti onal syste ms, i.e., a well-buffe red, well -
understood techn ica l co re requiring cons istency and 
stabi lit y fo r e ffecti ve, failure- free opera ti ons. Dec ision 
stra teg ies fo r mos t s ituati ons a re stra ightfo rward , we ll -
programmed , stand ard opera ting procedures (SOPs). 
Note the assumpti on that the o rga ni za tion is a unitary ent it y 
where there is no disse nt o r subgroup co nfli c t. The 
organi zation is assum ed to have a s ingle goa l, and a ll 
organi za tional members are assumed to share tha t goa l. In 
essence, La Porte and Co nso lini have accep ted the idea th at 
the o rgani za ti onal world is how the o rga ni za tional leaders 
co nstrue it. They are no t a lone in thi s v iew. There is a hu ge 
demand fo r the ' 'creati on" o f ·'s tro ng' ' o rga ni za ti onal 
cu ltures (see, e.g. , Schein, I 992 ; Nahava ndi . 1993). 
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Wou ld it be unreaso nabl e to suppose, however, that 
the re a re in fa c t subcultures tha t have diffe rent int e res ts. as 
revea led by Langewiesc he in his descripti on o f air traffi c 
cont ro l and Snook in hi s desc ripti on o f the part ic ipants in 
Operat ion Prov ide Comfort? Ca n schola rs and prac titi oners 
be so sanguin e as to suppose to tha t ambi guit y and issue-
specifi c att enti o n is a ma tte r o f just not '' try ing hard enough" 
(L3 Porte and Co nso lini , 199 1 :24)? 
T he va lue in viewing o rga ni za tions through multipl e 
lenses is apparent in Va ughan 's ( 1996) trea tment of the 
C ha ll enger d isas te r. If observers focus on j ust one eve nt -
the fa te ful meetin g on the eve o f the launch - they ca n g lea n 
add iti ona l ins ight into th e culture that a ll owed the laun ch in 
th e fa ce o f contrai ndi ca to rs. Va ug han writes , for ex amp le, 
that " [t)he prev io us ly shared va lues abo ut rul e fo ll owi ng. 
authorit y re lati o ns , and techni ca l ri go r tha t parti c ipants 
au tomati ca ll y in voked o n the eve of the launch did no t wo rk 
in the bes t inte rests of sa fe ty" ( I 996: 4 18). She assu mes th a t 
the re was consensus, c la rit y, and co ns istency wi th respect to 
the rules, autho rit y, and techni ca l rigor: ' 'the te leconfe rence 
was a m icrocos m th rough whi ch we wa tched these pattems 
o f the pas t reproduced in a s ingle, dynami c exchange" 
( 1996: 398). She th en assumes tha t these aspec ts o f cul ture 
made the c ho ice c lea r: "Not o nl y did the co n espo nd encc o f 
the ir ac ti ons w ith these cultu ra l scripts norma lize the ir 
actions, in the ir view, b ut the ir awa reness o f the ir conform it y 
had a sepa rate effec t. The fac t tha t they did eve rything they 
were supposed to do re in fo rced the techni ca l cho ices they 
made" ( 1996 397) 
W hat if these events a nd re la tions are viewed from a 
diffe renti ati on perspec ti ve? Might it become apparent that 
the culrures of e:~ch o f the g roups enab led the o the r g roups to 
proceed with fau lt y pre mi ses? M ig ht a be tt er und erstanding 
a ri se o f the power re la ti o ns amo ng th e groups? What 
contributio ns co ul d a frag ment a ti on perspective make? 
Mi ght it beco me c lea r tha t the phys ica l aJTangemc nts 
(parti c ipants a t tl1ree diffe ren t loca ti ons) c reated a mbiguit y 
and enhanced no t on ly the uncerta int y of the tec hno logy, bu t 
a lso the unce11a in ty rega rding how to co nstrue the situati on 
and reso lve cu nOi c ts? In o ther wo rds, canno t the very sa me 
man ifes ta ti o ns - rul es, ph ys ica l arrangements, s to ri es , e tc. 
reveal so me thing very di ffe rent s impl y by chang in g the 
perspec ti ve? 
It is no t jus t th e literanu-e adopting the integra ti on 
perspec ti ve that could bene fit from a dose of the o the r 
perspecti ves. S nook's (2000) ex pl an:~ ti on o f how F- 15s 
could shoo t frie ndl y B lack Hawks out of the sky mi ght be 
enhanced by the add ition o f an integra tio n analys is. Whil e 
S nook is exp li c it in hi s descripti on of the vario us subc ul nu-es 
that permea te the Armed Fo rces, and he desc ribes the 
diffe ring needs, ambi guity, and lack of co hes ion among the 
AWACS crew members, he does not co ns ider how the 
manifes ta ti ons might suggest c lar it y, cons is tency, and 
consensus. Are the re no underl ying assumpti ons th at are 
shared by members o f the a rm ed fo rces? Do the unifo rms 
mea n anything? W hat about no tions o f patriot ism? W hat 
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m y ths a nd s to ri es a re in c irc ul a ti o n? W ha t ritu a ls invo ke 
s ha red mea ning? Whil e S nook sugges ts ind iv id ua l, gro up, 
a nd o rga ni zatio na l fac to rs tha t co ntribut ed to the shoo tdo wn, 
th e re m ay be so me impli c it ex pecta ti o ns s ha red by me mbers 
acc ide nt inves tiga ti ons tha t it was the NASA culture that 
prevented d iscovery o f the ex tent o f the p roblem a nd hence 
any il lte mp t 10 re med y the p rob le m be fo re it culminated in 
d i s ;:~ s t c r 16 days a ft e r the in it ia l punc ture. 
f the milit ary tha t contri bute to these so rts o f inc ide nts. 
C OMBINI NG Til E P E RS P ECTIVES 
T he va lu e in v ie w in g a d isas te r fro m the th ree 
pe rs pec tives ca n be seen w ith the int cg r ;:~ ti o n o f the ma ny 
lite ra tures a na lyz ing the Space Shutll c Co lumb ia d isaste r, 
w h ic h occurred o n Fe b rua ry I , 2003. W hil e the punc tu re o f 
the le ft w ing by foa m tha t de tached fro m the rocke t booste r 
h ;:~ s been identifi ed as the phys ica l cul pr it , it is c lea r fro m the 
In hi s independent ex pose o f the Co lum bia di saster, 
Wi lli a m Langewe ische (2003) viewed N AS A 's c ultu re fro m 
each o f the three pe rspec tives, a I th o u •h he d id no t ide ntify 
his in vestigati o n in these te rm s. T hese th ree perspecti ves o n 
the sa me d isas ter s how a more robus t pi cture o f causation 
than a ny pe rspecti ve a lo ne . Exa mp les o f th e cultura l 
manifes ta tio ns seen by eac h pe rspec ti ve are lis ted in T abl e 2 : 
T a hl e 2 : C ultural Manifes tation s See n by E ac h Pe r s pect ive 
Int eg r a tion 
"S pace fl 1ght 1s l"'own 10 be a nsky 
bUSIIlCSS" 
• "They [the astrona ut s] were also team 
playe rs. by 1nt ens<:: se lectiOn, and nothin 
I r 1101 wi se 10 I he game." ( p 60) 
• Rt.: pon s from th~ a~ t ronaut s wc r~ " tVI 11ac lc 
Wh 1p on Wonder Bread . s tanda rd NASA 
fare" 
• " But all the f:"ul1 ng instrument s we re in th e 
left wi ng. The poss ible Slgnili cance o r th is 
was not los t on Cain: dunn g the lau11ch a 
pi ece of so lid foam had bro ~e n o tT r1nn1 
the shuttle's ex ternal fu el tank , and al h1 gh 
speed had smashed into the le ft "' "' •, a f't er 
111 1111 111:t l co ns H .. kr.l ll on the shunk prog rJ ill 
mana gers (w ho stood above M"s1on 
ontr I 111 the NASA hierarchy) had 
ui smissed the inc ident as esscnli:dl y 
unthrca tening. Li ke almost evc1 o n ~ d sc 
at NAS I\ Ca111 had taken the ma na •crs a t 
the ~r word- and he still d1d ." (p 6 1. 
emphaSIS added) 
• " In Houston th e contro ll ers mai n1 :11 ned 
d1 sc ip i111C, and cont inu ed p1 epa nng lo r the 
landing, even as they rece ived wo rd t h ~ t t 
the Men·itt Island racbr, in Flo ri da . winch 
should by now have sta11cd trad..ing th e 
inbound craft . was picking up only fa lse 
target.s." (p 63) 
• ··ca m tnststcd on contro l-room d t ~c tp l m c. 
He said , 'No phone ca lls o l'f s ,te out siCk of 
tl us room. Our di scuSS ions arc on these 
loops the reco rded DYIS loops only. No 
cl::tt a. no phone ca lls, no transmiss ions 
anywhcn..:, i nto or out. ' L::tter tl us was 
taken by some crit ics to be a typical 
NAS A reaction insular, fu 1i ve, 
overcontro ll1ng." (p.6J) . 
• " the la unch 1S a critica l and complicated 
opera tiOn, demandi ng close tea mwo rk, 
tight coo rd 11mt ion with Miss1011 Cont ro l, 
and dbovc all ex treme concent ra tion" 
Diffe r·entiation 
• "onl y a hand ful of peo ple - a few 
engmeers deep inside of NASA - wom ed 
that the vc\11clc and 1ts seven souls m1 ght 
ac tua lly come to gnef. " (p 60) 
• " In the jargon-laced language o r the 
contro l room Kling said . ' Fl ight , M.>es.' " 
(p 6 1) 
• "O ' Keefe [N ASA l\d m1111 Stra101] Was not 
a ::o. JJ.l Ct..: c rusnd cr, as some caliH.: r NAS A 
;~d min i s t r:J.t ors h::tcl been. and he W<t S not 
about to pick up the fa lle n banners of 
visionan cs and t1y to lead th L" wny fonva rcl 
.. NAS I\ 's true believe rs called tum a 
ca q1c1bagger and rcse11tcd the ;c heuulc 
pres, ure' he brought to bea r" (p 64) 
• " the ::, 1mu lator w t nt tnto the oce .. 1n well 
shon of the a~rpon The inc1den1 caused a 
ck ,turhance inside th ..: John;on Space 
C<.:nlcr, pdi1 1CU1arl y because o r the long-
standing struggk posseSS IOn or d.lla (and 
ult 11 mtcl y control) between the pilots 111 
ll1 ght anu th e eng111eers at 1he1r con>olcs · 
(p 69) 
• tl lto low-le vd eng1neers at the Ke11 nedy 
Sp.1cc C<.:nl cr whose JOb wao to rev iew the 
launch VJtk os <'\ nd fi lm were imJncdi :Jtc ly 
conce rn ed by the Sl7e and speed of the 
foam tha t had st ru ck the ohut tl c. 1\s 
e \pec ted of them. they compiled th e 
1 111~1 g~ry a nli dJ SSCilllll.lt cd 11 by c-mai l to 
vann u~ shu ttle cng 111 CC J~ and m,111a gc rs 
most signifi cantly those 111 charge oft he 
shuttl e progrom1 at the Johnson Sp.1cc 
Center. Rea i1 Ling thot their blurred o r 
othcn vJsc inadequate pictures ::, hnwcd 
no1h1ng of the da mage that m1ght have 
h..:en 1nfl ic ted, and antic1pat mg the need 
for such in i'o nnation by oth ers . the 
engineers at Kennedy then wc.: nt outs ide 
nonnal channels and on their own 
i11 itiativ...: approached the Dcpm1nH:nt of 
Defense wit h a request that sec ret mili tary 
satel lit es o r ground-based hi gh-reso lu tion 
cameras be used to 1hoto ' '"' Jh the shutt le 
44 
F ra~ ttt e ttt : tt io n 
• " though n!the Columb1a] co nt 111ued to lay 
!lares 111 Its wake, tht.: a~ t ro n ::w t s aboard 
rema1ncd bli ssfully ' " 'a" arc of the troub le 
th t.:y WC I C in" 
• ""S 1l1111g at th CII !'> p CC lllll lf..:d p0S il 10 11S, and 
mon11on ng the numbers d1 splayed on the 
COih>lkS, a ICII o r th e !li ght controll ers 
had •• egun to sense. JUSt hardy, that 
so mcth111g wns go1ng sctJ Ously wrong. T he 
\'-'O tT)' was not 4Uit l.: co l Jt..:JeJll yet O ne o f 
the CO ll i I oilers lat c1 to ld 111 c tha t 11 
amounted 10 an 111 ex pl1cahlc bad feeling i11 
Ins gut " (p 6 1) 
• " When wo1u gnt to th e \\' lute I louse, th e 
executi ve staff d ue ~ed qLII c ~ l y 11110 
dcfc n.;; I\T pos 1t HHl" PH:~ 1 den t Bush would 
gn~vc alo ngs u.h.: th~ f:11 11111 e\ and say the 
n ght tilin g~ about c.trryn1g o n, bu t rath~ r 
than invo l·.- ,ng h11nscl fb) app011111ng an 
mdepcnJ ent pres ltk nll ~d commissiOn. as 
Rnna ld Re.1ga n h,1d "' re,ponle 10 the 
k1llcnger ace1de nt , he wo uld ~cep h1s 
d1 , tanee by ex press ing l,llih 111 NAS A's 
abd11 y 10 lind the cau;.c. In other wo rds. 
ti ns baby was goi ng to be d1nppcd 
squarel y onto O'K eefe's lap The White 
I louse ;:tppro v~d ,e\u nll n's appointment to 
lead what woulu "'ent1al ly be NASA's 
in vestJ gat! On but O'Kee fe could expec t 
l1tt lc flll1hcr communicati on There was a 
chance that the Prc> idcnt wo uld not even 
wa nt to recc1vc the final reptll1 d~rcc t l y but 
would as ~ that 11 be deposll cd more 
diScreetl y in the Wl11 1e I louse in-box He 
had problems h1ggc1 1h.11 1 space on his 
mi nd " (p.6,1) 
• "Th is ti me. however, 11 t unH.~d out that two 
of the !light co nt ro llers had not 
CO illlllllllJ C at ~d CO ITCC tly With each Other, 
and that a the judgment of Miss ion Co nt rol 
therefore was wro ng." (p 69) 
• "' 13ccause the problem w:~s not idcntiii ed 
in th~ tr-;1di ti onal w3 y " l louston, we have 3 
Jroblcm '" - well, then. " llouston, we don't 
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Integration 
(p .69) 
• •'it had become a matter of faith with in 
NASA that foa m strik es- whi ch were a 
known problem- could no t cause 1110 11a l 
damage to the shuttl e" (p .73) 
Source: Langeweische, 2003. 
Journa l of Bus iness & Leaders hip : Researc h, Prac ti ce and Teachin g 
2008, Vo l. 4. No. I, 40-46 
Differentiation 
in o rbit. ' (p.77) 
• 'The MMT was a hi gh- level gro up . In the 
Houston hi erarchy it operat ed above th e 
ni ght co ntro llers in the Miss ion Contro l 
roo m, and just below th e shuttle progra m 
ma nage!'' (p.80) 
• "The fru stra ti on is tha t so me people on 
lov.ler levels were act ively won-ied about 
tha t possibi lit y, a nd they und erstood 
c lea rl y that not enough was known abo ut 
the effects o f th e foa m strik e on th e win g, 
but th ey ex pressed th eir co ncerns mostl y 
to o ne ano th er, a nd fo r good reaso n, 
because on th e few occas ions when they 
tri ed to a let1 the dec is ion-makers, NASA 's 
management sys tem overw helmed th em 
and a llowed none of th em to be hea rd ." 
(p .SO) 
• " They c la im th at th e culture in Housto n is 
a 'badge less soc iety,' mea ning it does n't 
matt er what you have on your badge-
yo u're co ncern ed abo ut shuttl e sa fet y 
togeth er. Well. tha t's a ll ni ce, but th e truth 
is that it does matter what badge you're 
weari ng. Look , if you rea ll y do have an 
organizati on that has free communi c~Hi o n 
a nd open doo rs and a ll tlut kind o f srull , it 
takes a spec ial ki nd o f ma nagement to 
ma ke it work . And we just don't see th at 
ma nagement here. Oil , th ey say a ll th e 
ri ght things. "We have open doo rs and e-
ma il s, a nd a nybody who sees a prob lem 
ca n ra ise hi s hand , b low a whi stl e, a nd 
stop the who le process. " But then when 
yo u loo k a t how it rea ll y wo rks, it's an 
incestuous, hierarchica l system, wit h 
in visible ra nkings and a very stri ct 
in fo nna l cha in of co mma nd" (p.82) 
• " th e as tro na uts had been to ld o f the st,-i ke, 
bu t a lmos t as if th ey were c hildren who 
didn ' t need to be in vo lved in th e g row n-up 
co nversati on" (p.85) 
Fragmentation 
have a problem '" Beca use Housto n d id n't 
id entify th e problem.' " (p.S I) 
• "The confus ion was now total, yet also 
nea rly in vis ibl e - and wi thi n the 
suppressive culture oCt he human 
spacc n ight program , it had very litt le 
chance of makin g itself kn ow n. At the top 
o f the ta ng le. ne ither Ron Ditt emo re no r 
Linda Ham ever lcamcd that the Debri s 
Asscssm~nt T eam wa nted pictures; at the 
bo ttom , th e Dcb1i s Assess ment eng ineers 
hea rd the ' no' wi thout sus pectin g th at it 
was not an answer to their requ es t. They 
were to ld to go back to th e Crater model 
and numerl cal analysis, and as ea n1 cst, 
hardworkin g eng in eers (hard ly rebel s, 
th ese), they duti ful ly co mpli ed , a ll the 
whil e regrett ing th e bli nd assumpti ons that 
they would have to mak e. Given th e 
obvious potentia l for a ca tastroph e, one 
might ex pect tha t th ey woul d have go ne 
directl y to Linda Ham, o n foot if 
necessary, to make the argument in person 
fo r a spacewa lk or hi gh- reso lut ion pho tos. 
However, such were th e constraints with in 
the Jo hnso n Space Cente r that they never 
d3rcd . They la ter sai d th at had they made a 
fuss about the s huttl e, th ey mi ght have 
been s ing led out fo r ridi c ule. T hey fea red 
for th ei r s t ~mding , and th ei r careers." 
(p.S I) 
What is striking is the effec t of the diffe renti at ion and 
fragmentat ion pe rspecti ves on the deco mpositi on of the 
disaster. It is these views of culture tha t hi ghli ght the 
problems NASA had with co mmun ication, an ins ighl 
thoroughly lost by viewing the culture from an integrati on 
perspecti ve a lone. The int egration pe rspective is 
neverthe less important in draw ing a ttention to wha t NASA 
management beli eved was happening (sharing i11fo rma ti on) 
and according ly be lieved could no t be happening (hoarding 
information). 
organiza tio nal ac to rs share are like ly to mi ss those very 
fac tors that a re mos t li ke ly to contr ibute to a systems fai lure. 
For examp le, NASA managers assum ed that a ll 
o rgani za tio nal parti c ipants bought inl o the no tio n o f "open 
doo rs" when it ca me to sa fe ty, ye t engineers in th e lower 
echelons of NASA be li eved tha t if they exp ressed the ir 
concem s free ly, they would lose the ir jobs (Langewe ischc, 
2003). 
Another implica tio n is that so metimes the sa me cul ture 
that he lps an organi za tio n achi eve certa in goa ls hurts the 
same o rga ni za tio n 's pursuit of o ther goa ls. T hi s was obvio us 
in the Cha ll enger d isas ter, where the same hi ghl y struc tured 
culture that preve nted poo r dec isions in mos t cases in fa c t 
led to res istance to cance lling that fli ght. Thi s appea rs to be 
particul ar ly prob lematic when a s ituati on arises tha t is 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The manageria l implicati ons of us ing a ll three 
perspectives on organi za ti onal culture are s ignifi cant. 
Managers that view cu lture as onl y those fa ctors that 
45 
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outs ide the ra nge o f ex pecta ti ons, th e " Blac k Swan" eve nt. 
In the case o f the Cha llenger, the Black Swan was an 
unusua ll y low tempera ture; in the case o f Co lumbia, it was a 
la rge piece o f foa m hittin g a t an unu sual and unex pected 
loca ti o n. N AS A in bo th cases re li ed on a hi ghl y integrated 
culture tha t dealt we ll w ith " routine" ri sks, and suppressed 
info rmati on fl ow fro m diffe renti a ti o n/ fra g mentation 
e le ments that we re more a le rt to impli cati o ns o f the .. outlie r" 
s itua ti o ns. 
A n additi ona l impo n ant impli ca tio n is that managers 
mus t rea li ze that the o rga ni za tion they see is no t necessaril y 
th e o rga ni za ti on o the rs see. Where managers see o rder, 
e ffi c iency, and co mpetence, o ther o rgani za tio na l panic ipants 
ma y see ri g idity, dis regard fo r sa fe ty, and b lind obedi ence to 
pro toco l. Rea li z ing tha t culture is more tha n what is shared 
by a ll o r imposed by management w ill he lp managers be 
more e ffec ti ve in e ns uring th at subcultures co mmuni ca te 
w ith each o ther and s hare be li efs and assumpti ons. 
C ONCLUSIO NS 
Like the author who was spea king prose hi s entire life 
w ithout knowing it , the sys te ms d isasters resea rc hers have 
bee n spea king culture, o ften without ac knowledg ing it. 
O rga ni za ti ona l culture pl ayed a s igni fi c:mt ro le in eac h o f 
the inc idents described above. An orga ni za ti o n 's culture -
and its e ffect o n re li ability and di saste rs - can be full y 
understood onl y whe n a ll tlu·ee pe rspec ti ves a re app lied . 
O nl y then can c ultura l pe rspecti ves full y address the 
troubling questi o n: how ca n such te rrible thin gs happen in 
spite o f o ur bes t e ffo rts to prevent the m? 
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